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This thesis analyzes the role that domestic politics 
plays in the decision making process of the leaders of 
Israel and Syria with regard to returning the Golan 
Heights. 
Many argue that the core issue of the Golan is purely 
military, relating to the security buffer that the occupied 
territory provides to Israel’s northern settlements.  While 
holding the high ground is still a key military tenet when 
evaluating terrain, Israel’s security rationale for keeping 
the Golan Heights has little credibility, as demonstrated 
by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s readiness to turn 
over all but 200 meters of the Golan to Syria during the 
last round of serious negations between both countries.  
I argue that the return of the Golan Heights is not a 
bilateral security issue between Israel and Syria but is 
instead an internal domestic matter.  The return of the 
Golan depends on domestic politics within each country more 
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Many argue that that the principle reason Israel holds 
on to the Golan Heights is purely military, relating to the 
indispensable strategic buffer zone, early warning and 
surveillance capacity, and the advantageous position the 
Golan provides for launching an offensive against Syria. 
This latter capability also provides a good measure of 
deterrence.  
While holding the high ground is still a key military 
tenet when evaluating terrain, Israel’s security rationale 
for keeping the Golan can be questioned, as evidenced by 
former Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s readiness to turn over 
all but 200 meters of the Golan Heights to Syria, during 
the last round of negotiations between both countries. 
With the death of President Hafez al-Asad in 2000, his 
successor and son, Bashar, faces the same challenges and 
internal opposition when negotiating with Israel about the 
return of the Golan. Current analysis of the new Syrian 
President after his first year in office reveals that he is 
still developing his power base, and some would argue 
fighting for his survival.  Thus any shift from his 
father’s policy regarding the full return of the Golan 
Heights would be political suicide.1  
 
 
                    1 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy. Strategic Geography and the Changing 
Middle East. Brookings Institute Press.  Washington D.C. 1997: 93. 
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In this thesis I argue that the Israeli myth of 
keeping the Golan purely for security reasons can be 
shattered.  While the return of the Golan Heights does 
create new security concerns for the state of Israel, these 
challenges can be overcome.  What propels the return of the 
Golan is not purely a bilateral security issue between 
Israel and Syria, but is instead an internal domestic 
matter which drives the political decision-making process 
in each country.  Furthermore, an analysis will be made 
comparing the internal politics involved in a hardline 
versus a softline approach, and the domestic costs and 
benefits of each tactic to resolve the issue of returning 
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A. WHAT IS THE GOLAN 
The Golan Heights is a mountainous plateau rising 
steeply from the Jordan River valley along Israel’s 
northeast border.  It covers approximately 780 square 
miles.  The average altitude of the heights is 3,200 feet, 
with Mount Hermon in the north rising to an elevation of 
7,296 feet. The location and elevation of the Golan Heights 
makes it a key geostrategic piece of terrain in the Middle 
East.  Since their capture of the Golan Heights from Syria 
in the 1967 War, the Israelis have occupied, annexed and 
established settlements on it.  There is no greater point 
of contention between Israel and Syria today than the full 
withdrawal and complete return of the Golan Heights. 
B. CAPTURING THE GOLAN  
During the 1967 War, Israel acquired the Golan Heights 
after two days (9-10 June) of some of the fiercest armor 
and infantry assaults of the war. By seizing the Golan the 
Israelis negated the threat of a possible Syrian attack 
against northern Galilee.  Israeli artillery and armor now 
commanded the high ground and look down on Damascus.   
Given its capture of the Golan Heights the Israeli 
government widely believed that if it played its cards 
correctly, it could use the Golan to pave the way for peace 
negotiations with Syria2.  On June 19, 1967, the Israeli 
Cabinet unanimously voted to return the whole of the Golan 
Heights to Syria in return for peace and demilitarization.3  
                    2 Chaim Herzog.  The Arab Israeli Wars.  Vantage Books, Random House. New York, 
1984: 189. 
3 Ibid: 190. 
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At the Arab Summit Conference at Khartoum on 1 September 
1967, the Arab leaders passed the “four no’s” resolution – 
no talks before withdrawal [from the Golan], no direct 
negotiations with Israel, no partial solutions over the 
Golan, no recognition and formal peace with Israel.4  Thus, 
the ground was prepared for a further renewal of 
hostilities. During the 1973 War, Syria briefly recaptured 
a portion of the Golan Heights, but Israel quickly regained 
its lost terrain and captured additional Syrian territory.  
In 1974, the “Israeli-Syrian Disengagement of Forces 
Agreement” was signed.5  Both Israel and Syria recognized 
that the disengagement of forces was the first step towards 
a just and durable peace based on UN Resolutions 242 and 
338.6  President Hafez al-Asad also made verbal commitments 
not to allow guerrilla raids from the Syrian side of the 
disengagement line.7  Because of this agreement, there has 
been no major conflict on the Golan since 1973. 
C. ANNEXATION 
On December 14, 1981, Israel passed legislation to 
bring the Golan Heights under Israeli civil law, 
jurisdiction and administration.8  The United States 
criticized the Israeli action and the UN Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 497, declaring the Israeli 
action “null and void and without international legal; 
effect.”9 
                    
4 Ibid: 191. 
5 Muhammad Muslih.  “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready.”  Foreign Policy, No.96, 
Fall 1994: 145. 
6 UNR 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied 
territories and the recognition of the Israeli state. UNR 338 proclaims that the 
Golan is sovereign territory of Syria.  
7 Muslih. “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready:” 146. 
8 Aryeh Shalev. Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan.  Westview 
Press.  Boulder Co. 1994: 82. 
9 UN Security Council Resolution 497 of December 17, 1981. Shalev: 85. 
 3
D. DILEMMAS FACING ISRAEL 
Since Israel controls the Golan, it can dictate the 
terms about how it will be returned, as well as the time 
frame in which the handover will be completed. Many argue 
that the core issue for Israel keeping the Golan Heights is 
purely military, relating to the indispensable strategic 
buffer zone, early warning and surveillance capacity and 
the advantageous position the Golan provides for launching 
an offensive against Syria. This latter capability also 
provides a good measure of deterrence.  
While holding the high ground is still a key military 
tenet when evaluating terrain, Israel’s security rationale 
for keeping the Golan can be seriously questioned, with 
former Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s readiness to turn over 
all but 200 meters of the Golan Heights to Syria, during 
the last round of serious negotiations between each 
country. 
E. DILEMMAS FACING SYRIA 
With the death of President Hafiz al-Assad in June of 
2000, his successor and son, Bashar, faces the same 
challenges and internal opposition as his father, when 
negotiating with Israel over the return of the Golan. After 
his first year in office he is still developing his power 
base, and some would argue fighting for his survival.  Thus 
any shift from his father’s policy regarding the full 
return of the Golan Heights would be political suicide.10  
                    10 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy. Strategic Geography and the Changing 





The Israeli myth of keeping the Golan purely for 
security reasons can be shattered.  While the return of the 
Golan Heights does create new security concerns for the 
state of Israel, these challenges can be overcome.  What 
prevents the return of the Golan is not purely a bilateral 
security issue between Israel and Syria but is instead 
driven by internal domestic politics.  
In this thesis I compare the internal politics of a 
hardline verses a softline approach and the domestic costs 
and benefits of each tactic, in order to resolve the issue 














II. SECURITY ISSUES IMPACTING GOLAN NEGOTIATIONS 
A. MILITARY: STRATEGIC TERRAIN 
The Golan is certainly important to Israel for 
security reasons. However, further analysis will reveal 
that the security rationale for keeping the Golan Heights 
is inflated.  Given most Syrian armaments threaten both the 
Israeli Defense Forces as well as the civilian population, 
there is a concern among many Israelis that Syria could 
mount another attack against northern Israel through the 
Golan.  Many Israelis fiercely insist that the Golan is a 
critical strategic buffer and the intelligence facilities 
on the slope of Mount Hermon are indispensable, providing 
extensive visual and electronic intelligence, which 
produces vital, detailed tactical and strategic early 
warning data.11   
Yet, Israel has sufficient intelligence assets to 
offset the loss of its intelligence facilities on the Golan 
Heights and should suffer no major loss in warning 
capabilities by withdrawing from the Golan.12  Israel has 
ample ground and airborne intelligence assets available to 
replace crucial data gathered on the Golan itself.13  
                    
11 Israel places high importance on early warning.  With a small standing army of 
136,000 Israel nominally requires 24-96 hours to fully mobilize, equip and deploy 
its 363,000 reserve soldiers to the battle zone. 
12 Gotowicki: 41. 
13 Israel’s intelligence assets include the newly developed Phalcon Airborne 
Early Warning aircraft.  The Phalcon employs a phased-array radar with Moving Target 
Indictor (MTI) mode capabilities, which allows it to simultaneously track 100 
ground, or air targets to a range of 250 miles, (well beyond what would be needed 
for Golan surveillance).  Israel also has MTI capable radars mounted on some of its 
reconnaissance fighter aircraft, which can provide early warning out to 50 miles.  
In conjunction with these systems, Israel also has a variety of airborne mounted, 
long range, electro-optical ELINT (electronic intelligence), SIGINT 
(signal/communications intelligence), thermal signature, FLIR (forward looking 
infrared radar, SLAR (side looking airborne radar), remotely piloted vehicle, and 
balloon aerostat intelligence systems.  Source: Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare 
Systems 2000-2001: 84,204,343,462. 
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Additionally, 71 percent of Israeli reserve generals think 
that security arrangements are possible if much of the 
Golan is returned to Syria.14  Indeed Israeli military 
experts widely agree that the Golan has lost much, if not 
most of its military importance to Israel since 1967.15  In 
military terms, Israel does not need peace with Syria;16 
Israel maintains a pronounced military superiority over 
Syria and the border has been quiet and stable since 1974. 
In many Israeli circles the status quo is acceptable.  
If we evaluate the military balance of powers, the need to 
keep the Golan for security reasons becomes difficult to 
rationalize.  We must look at two factors when comparing 
military balance: numbers and potency.  The aggregate 
difference between the Israeli and Syrian militaries is not 
significantly large.17 But Israel has the force multiplier 
of possessing a greater number of ground operating systems 
that are more potent and advanced.  In combat aircraft the 
Israeli Air Force (IDF) is the regions’ most effective 
fighting force.  The IDF commands unquestioned numerical 
and technological capabilities over Syria.  Although Syria 
can cause substantial damage to Israel, it cannot win a war 
against it. Syria does have significant armed forces but 
most experts contend that its military cannot project or 
sustain its power far beyond its borders.18  Today, the 
                    14 Muslih.  “The Golan: Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations:” The Middle 
East Journal, Vol.47, No. 4 Autumn 1993: 625. 
15 Aryeh Shalev.  Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan.  Westview 
Press, Boulder CO. 1994:  
16 Stephen H. Gotowicki. Considering a U.S. Military Force on the Golan. Edited 
by Stephen C. Pelletiere. The Peace Process, Phase One. Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA 1997:33. 
17 Ibid: 31. 
18 Gotowicki: 33. 
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Syrian Air Force is basically non-existent and the rest of 
the military is in poor shape. 
It is very difficult to imagine any compelling reasons 
why Syria would attack Israel if Israel withdrew from the 
Golan Heights. Syria is no match for Israel in terms of 
economic development and military prowess.19 An attack upon 
Israel from the Golan would carry significant strategic 
risks for Syria.  It would likely precipitate an Israeli 
military ground response outflanking Syrian forces through 
Lebanon (the Bekaa Valley) or threatening Damascus through 
Jordan. In either case, Syria would be hard pressed to 
effectively respond.  The Israeli Air Force would also 
conduct a punitive air campaign against high-value Syrian 
targets and cities.  Additionally, the Syrians take 
seriously (as do most of the Arab states), the threat posed 
by the reputed Israeli nuclear arsenal.  Thus a state of 
peace and economic cooperation is the best security 
arrangement for Syria. 
B. SETTLEMENTS 
Israel placed the Golan under military administration, 
and began to establish settlements in late 1967.20  It was 
considered imperative that colonization should begin 
without delay, with the fundamental objective to anchor the 
Golan to Israel through agriculture.21  It had previously 
been thought that the kibbutzim and moshavim manned by 
Israelis, would act as defensive field fortifications, 
which would disrupt guerilla routes. But, as was seen in 
                    
19 Muslih. “The Golan: Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations:” 625. 
20 William Wilson Harris. Taking Root: Israeli Settlements in the West Bank, the 
Golan and Gaza-Sinai, 1967-1980. Research Studies Press. Letchworth England, 
1980:67. 
21 Harris: 62. 
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the face of massed tank formations in 1973, the idea proved 
to be a liability.22  
The 1973 War (6-24 October) interrupted the expansion 
of settlements in the Golan.  In the face of the great 
Syrian tank assault of 6-8 October 1973, all settlement 
sites had to be evacuated on the first day of the war. The 
evacuation of the settlements diverted a significant 
portion of the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) military 
capability.  After a successful counter-attack and a return 
to normalcy, the long-standing strategy that civilian 
settlements were of military value was brought into 
question.23  After the 1973 War some argued that there was a 
certain illogic in Israeli references to the Golan as a 
strategic buffer just because it had been occupied and 
settled.  As the 1973 war proved a buffer zone that is 
settled is no buffer zone.24  
According to Ze’ev Maoz, Director of the Jaffee 
Center, the claim that the Golan provides strategic depth 
that protects Galilee has led to an absurdity:  
we are simply transferring the Galilee to the 
Golan, and the problem of defending the Golan 
today will turn into the problem of how to defend 
the Jewish population of the Golan in few years 
hence. The settlers would likely inhibit the IDFs 
strategic response to Syrian aggression.25  
 
 
                    
22 Ibid: 71. 
23 Harris: 71. 
24 Gotowicki: 26. 
25 Ibid: 26. 
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Syrian officials also question the logic underlying 
the security value that the Israelis attach to the 
settlements. “The Israelis claim that they took the Golan 
to protect their settlements, but then they built new 
settlements on the Golan, some only three hundred meters 
from our territory.”26 
Most people considered the 1973 war to be a 
predictable Arab move to regain lost territory and halt 
Israel’s annexation policies.  But because the Israeli 
leadership viewed the war as continuing proof that most 
Arabs rejected Israel’s right to exist, the need for 
buffers afforded by such areas as the Golan was reinforced 
rather than shaken.27   
The Israeli leadership remained convinced in its 
belief that the settlements were the best means of securing 
defensible borders. While settlement expansion into the 
Golan continued, there was resistance from some left-wing 
Cabinet members, in whose view such activity placed an 
undesirable constraint on Israel’s negotiating position.28  
The post-war controversy generated frequent press 
attacks, real unease in the Army and some erosion of public 
support for the Golan settlements.29  
Despite Israeli domestic politics over colonization of 
the Golan, the construction of settlements prevailed 
because in the government’s view, the settlement system had 
to be strengthened to establish the military presence in a 
                    
26 Comments by President Hafaz al-Asad to President Jimmy Carter. Muslih: “The 
Golan: Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations:” 628.  
27 Harris: 71. 
28 Ibid: 72. 
29 Harris: 80. 
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vital buffer zone.30  Additionally, the success of the 
settlers’ lobbies, as settlers sought to insert themselves 
into the public consciousness and into the political 
system, greatly changed the domestic political realities of 
the settlement program.31  
What today amount to forty-two Israeli settlements, 
which contain 20,000 settlers32, constitute a significant 
political problem for the Israeli government and are one 
factor driving the internal political debate over the 
return of the Golan Heights.   
Many Israelis are adverse to the idea of dismantling 
Jewish settlements.  In any accord, Syria will certainly 
insist upon their removal.  The Syrian demand could lead to 
a percentage of the 20,000 settlers who are deeply tied to 
their land to refuse to leave their homes peaceably. This 
raises the specter of Yamit33 for the Israeli government. 
Others Israelis do not rule out evacuation of some 
Jewish settlements and then argue that just as there are 
many Arabs living under Israeli rule, there is no reason to 
prevent Israelis from living under Arab rule.34  
Three political obstacles stand in the way of 
dismantling the settlements on the Golan: the powerful 
Golan Lobby, the strong opposition by Labor hardliners, and 
                    
30 Ibid: 82. 
31 Ibid: 96. 
32 The World Factbook,2000, Washington DC: Central Intelligence 
Agency:www.odci.gov/cia/publications/fact book/index.html. 
33 Yamit was an Israeli settlement in the Sinai that was evacuated by force by 
the Israeli government, during the withdrawal of the IDF from the Sinai in 1982.  
The extensive press coverage resulted in significant embarrassment to the Likud-led 
government. 
34 Muslih.  “The Golan: Israel-Syria and Strategic Calculations:” 623. 
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most of the right wing parties in Israel politics.35  It is 
from these groups that top politicians, who take a hardline 
approach to returning the Golan, gain their greatest 
support and biggest political payoff. 
C. WATER 
Water is second only to security in importance to 
Israel when it comes to the Golan.  Approximately 30 
percent of Israel’s national water supply comes from the 
Golan.36  
For Israel, control of the Golan Heights not only 
bolsters its strategic position but also enhances its 
control of regional water sources.  For instance the 
headwaters of the Jordan River originate on Mount Hermon. 
Additionally, the Golan receives a lot of precipitation and 
has important cachment areas that hold substantial 
quantities of water, which find their way to the Jordan 
River, and into Israel’s water supply. 
Israeli right-wing parties regularly cite the water 
that comes from the Golan as one of their main reasons for 
wanting Israel to keep the Heights.37 
Syrian-Israeli confrontation to manipulate the waters 
of the Jordan River escalated in the 1960s even before 
Israel occupied the Golan. The importance of water sources 
on the Golan bore heavily on Israel’s initial policy 
decision of creeping annexation and Syria’s determination 
to oppose and resist such action, regardless of the price.38  
In 1963-64, Israel proceeded with a plan to divert some of 
                    
35 Ibid: 623. 
36 Kemp: 105. 
37 Julian Ozanne and David Gardner. Middle East peace would be a mirage without a 
water deal.  Financial Times. August 8, 1995: 3. 
38 Muslih. “The Golan: Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations:” 620. 
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the water from the Jordan River to expand agricultural 
settlement in the Negev Desert.39  The plan called for the 
construction of a drainage ditch in a disputed area where a 
spring was located, supposedly believed to be the source of 
the Jordan River.  Syria threatened to go to war in order 
to abort this project.40  The project did result in an 
escalation of tension, which resulted in a clash.41   
At the Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo in 1964, a 
decision was made to divert the tributaries of the Jordan 
as part of a comprehensive Arab strategy to confront 
Israel.42  The resulting conflict, known as the “war over 
the waters43”, escalated in the fall of 1964, when Syria 
commenced work on its diversion scheme to deny Israel 
water, by attempting to divert the flow of two of the three 
springs on the Golan that feed the Jordan River. The Syrian 
project was effectively halted between March 1965 and July 
1966, when Israeli jets and tanks in four separate border 
clashes destroyed the engineering equipment used to 
construct the canal.44  
Water remains a key strategic issue in the Middle 
East, particularly in those exact spots where it is to be 
                    
39 Shalev: 157. 
40 Itamar Rabinovich.  The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations. 
Princeton University Press, 1998: Rabinovich: 20. 
41 On November 13, 1964, in the northern area of the armistice demarcation, 
particularly in the Ayn Tall al-Qadi area, the Syrians opened fire at an Israeli 
military patrol that had encroached upon disputed territory.  Israel resorted to air 
power, and before a cease-fire became effective three Israeli solders had been 
killed and nine wounded; on the Syrian side, seven people had been killed and 
twenty-six injured mostly civilian.  UN Report, S/6061, November 24, 1964 as quoted 
in, Muhammad Muslih. “The Golan: Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations.”  The 
Middle East Journal. Vol. 47, No. 4: 620. 
42 Shalev: 159 and Rabinovich: 20. 
43 The term “the war over the waters” was used in The Golan Heights: A Vital 
Strategic Asset for Israel, by David Eshel in: From Rabin To Netanyahu: Israel’s 
Troubled Agenda. Edited by Efraim Karsh.  Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1997: 229. 
44 Shalev: 160-161. 
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found. The fact that the water situation has deteriorated 
progressively as the countries in the region have faced 
greater water shortages makes the water dimension of the 
Israeli-Syrian conflict particularly significant. 
Although many observers agree that the control and 
utilization of the waters emanating from the Golan can be 
successfully achieved through international management in 
order to benefit all sides, one point that cannot be 
minimized is the fact that Israel will need some type of 
iron-clad guarantees that current water flows will 
continue, and an equitable distribution of water will have 
to be agreed upon before it will ever relinquish control of 
the Golan Heights.45 
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III. THE GOLAN IN ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICS 
A. CHALLENGES 
It is evident that returning Golan is not simply a 
bilateral security issue between Israel and Syria, but 
rather has internal domestic implications, which drives the 
political decision-making process in each country. The 
political payoffs and penalties for top politicians to 
either make concessions over the Golan or to take a 
hardline approach drives Israeli domestic policy in 
particular. 
Israeli public opinion about the withdrawal from the 
Golan should be understood within the larger context of the 
Israeli-Syrian conflict. Both Israel and Syria mistrust 
each other deeply.  Syria believes that between 1948 and 
1967, Israel expanded at Syria’s expense through ruse, 
deception, and outright military conquest, while Israelis 
maintain a deep-seated fear of the potential threat that 
Syrian ground troops and weapons on the Golan pose to their 
country’s security. 
There are three Israeli perspectives regarding the 
Golan Heights: First there are those who are ambivalent 
about the extent of a potential withdrawal from the Golan.  
Second, are those who have adopted and seek to retain the 
Golan for security reasons.  And third are those who 
advocate a more softline approach endorsing full withdrawal 
in return for full peace.  Peace is Israel’s ultimate goal, 
while total withdrawal to the Israeli-Syrian border of June 
4, 1967 is Syria’s ultimate goal.  Once reconciliation is 
 16
reached on these two values, military technicians are 
likely to be able to finesse the security concerns.46 
Apart from the more dovish elements in Israeli 
politics, most Israelis still hesitate to pay the price of 
peace with Syria47, which is the full return of the Golan 
Heights.  Thus, a political hardline approach regarding 
negotiations with Syria over the Golan Heights holds a 
certain appeal.  For those top politicians taking a 
softline approach, their challenge lies in rallying the 
required public support for controversial polices (such as 
returning the Golan), and making the case that there are 
more risks in maintaining the status quo (with Syria) than 
in altering it. 
B. DOMESTIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A HARDLINE APPROACH 
There are those political leaders who believe that 
Israel needs to retain the Golan.48 Their assumption is 
based on the argument that Syria is not ready for peace, 
and that it cannot be trusted to honor peace because of the 
nature of its ruling regime and Bathist ideology.49 
For hardliners, time and space are critical components 
in calculating the mobilization and deployment of IDF 
Reserve units necessary to repel any type of Syrian 
aggression. From their point of view security is territory. 
At the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference Prime Minister 
Shamir was not at all inclined to participate in a peace 
conference, for both ideological and security reasons.  
Negotiations between Israel and Syria over the Golan did 
                    
46 Muslih.  “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready:” 154. 
47 Muslih. “The Golan: Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations:” 625. 
48 Most Likud members and a number of Labor hard-liners fall in to this category. 
49 Muslih. “The Golan: Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations:” 623. 
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not flourish during Likud’s tenure (1988-1992).  The first 
team of Israeli-Syria negotiators to enter into bilateral 
talks in December of 1991 made no appreciable headway50 and 
gave the impression they were in Washington for 
negotiations when, in effect, both sides had tacitly agreed 
to mark time together.51  
The domestic costs of this hardline, no-action 
approach to the Golan contributed to Shamir losing the 
election in 1992, when Israeli voters rejected the Lukid 
Party and chose instead the center-left Labor block led by 
Yitzhak Rabin52 (to be described below).  
In May of 1996 another hardliner Benjamin Netanyahu 
was elected as Israeli Premier.  His vigorous criticism of 
Labor and the Peres government, his “peace with security” 
mandate by the Israeli public and an uncompromising 
approach towards Syria and the Golan, resulted in a 
domestic pay-off of winning the election and having Likud 
returned to power. 
The bilateral negotiations which only months earlier 
(March 1996) seemed tantalizingly close to a final 
agreement now faced a 180-degree turnabout.53   The Likud 
Party’s hardline approach had already stalemated the 
Israeli-Syrian negotiations in 1992, and Netanyahu appeared 
no less flexible four years later.   
Netanyahu started from a hardline position. He 
reiterated campaign promises to undertake no withdrawal at 
                    50 Helena Cobban.  Syria and the Peace: A Good Chance Missed.  Strategic Studies 
Institute.  U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.  1997: 4. 
51 Pipes: 54. 
52 Muslih. “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready:” 150. 
53 Cobban: 3.  
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all from the Golan54, and vowed that he would not be bound 
by any of the verbal commitments made by his predecessors.55 
Israel’s new hardline position under the Likud 
regarding the peace talks was that the negotiations should 
be resumed “with out prior conditions” and that nothing of 
a binding nature had been agreed to by the two countries.56  
The following statement made by Yehuda Wolman, 
Chairman of the Golan Heights Regional Council, goes a long 
way to explain the hardline approach taken by top 
politicians when dealing with the issue of negotiating the 
return of the Golan:  
I’m sure that any Israeli government that will 
return the Golan Heights will fall, even if it 
returns just one settlement. 
 
Today, Ariel Sharon has continued with the Likud 
Party’s hardline approach over the return of the Golan.  
This only frustrates the Syrians and does little to develop 
and push forward the peace process.  Prior to becoming the 
Prime Minister, Sharon declared that he would never return 
the Golan Heights.  
The following excerpts from an article written by 
Ariel Sharon in December of 1999, highlight his views on 
Syria and the return of the Golan Heights: 
                    
54 In draft government guidelines drawn up on June 7 1996, Netanyahu reportedly 
wrote: “The Golan is an area essential to the existence of Israel.  The Golan is an 
important Zionist settlement region of the state that is essential for its security 
and for the preservation of its water resources.  The government will insist on 
Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan in any peace arrangement, and will bolster 
settlement enterprises on the Golan.”  Cobban: 30-31. 
55 Cobban: 3 
56 Rabinovich: 4. 
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As Israeli and Syrian teams hurry back to 
Washington to resume negotiations, we are told 
that Israel must take it or face war.  I believe 
this hasty approach is wrong and, above all 
misleading.  
First, there must be no rewards for the 
aggressor.  In most conflicts negotiated in this 
century, the aggressor paid by losing territory, 
as Japan and Germany did after World War II.  
Syria attacked Israel three times; in 1948, 1967 
and the Yom Kippur War of 1973.  From 1948 to 
1967, it carried on a war of attrition against 
Israeli civilians by attempting to divert vital 
water resources from Israel. 
Now Israel is asked to reward the aggressor by 
allowing return of the heights that rise over its 
territory from the valley below. 
Knowledgeable statesman and strategic experts 
have warned that given the nondemocratic, 
authoritarian character of the Syria regime and 
the unpredictability of what might take place in 
Syria after Hafez al-Asad is no longer in power, 
an Israeli agreement to return to the 1967 
borders could cause Israel to end up with neither 
peace nor the Golan Heights. 
 
In the first part of his article, Sharon directly 
condemns the Labor Party’s reckless policy regarding the 
return of the Golan and the inability to trust the Syrians.   
Second, national defense requires territory.  
Most foreign defense experts and senior United 
States Army Officers, who have visited the Golan 
or studied it, repeat the categorical opinion 
that even in the missile age it is impossible to 
defend Israel effectively against a ground attack 
without military control of the Golan Heights. 
The last and only line where an assault by Syria 
could be stopped runs through the center of the 
heights. 
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Fourth, Israel must have control of its water 
resources, which are of great long-term 
importance in an arid region, where there is 
already shortages.  A third of Israel’s water 
flows from the Golan Heights and could be 
diverted.  Israel must continue to have a 
presence near these waters. 
 
Sharon plays the same hardline tune to the Israeli 
body politic that the Golan cannot be returned because of 
security and water issues. While the issues are relevant, 
they can be successfully negotiated.  
Today Israel is being called upon to make so-
called painful compromises.  It is asked to give 
up the Golan, transferring to foreign troops a 
major building block of its overall capability to 
defend itself, deter attacks and assure itself of 
early warning if an attack should occur.  It is 
also asked to bear the painful costs of 
transferring 18,000 of its own citizens and 
uprooting 33 communities, deepening already 
dangerous divisions in Israeli society.  All this 
for what is at best an uncertain nonbelligerency 
agreement?  Thanks, but no thanks. 
I believe Israel must keep the Golan Heights.  
Peace is important for Israel, and we all seek 
it.  But it is no less important for the Syrians.  
Isn’t it about time that they were asked to make 
some painful concessions.57 
 
In his conclusion, Sharon attempts to wrap up the 
status quo in a blanket of peace but fails.  Sharon knows 
as does every Israeli, that peace with Syria means the full 
return of the Golan Heights.  
                    
57 Ariel Sharon.  “Why Should Israel Reward Syria?”  New York Times. December 28, 
1999. 
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Since assuming office, Sharon has toned down his 
rhetoric and stated that he wants to consider resuming 
Israeli-Syrian negotiations over the return of the 
Golan without any preconditions.  This is exactly what 
former Prime Minister Netanyahu said, which to the 
Syrians simply means negotiations for the sake of 
negotiations.  This amounts to a waste of time.58  
Furthermore Sharon fails to recognize the terms of 
reference represented by UN resolutions 242 and 338,59 
a precondition for any meaningful dialogue.  
It is clear that this hardline stance will not 
work.  For any chance to achieve peace and the 
benefits it will bring to Israel and the region, a 
softline approach must be taken. 
C. DOMESTIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A SOFTLINE APPROACH 
There are those Israelis in the Labor Party and 
others, who maintain that Israel should seriously consider 
total withdraw from the Golan in return for a full peace.  
This softline approach challenges the logic of those who 
argue that territory is security.  Furthermore they realize 
that Syria will not enter or sign any peace agreement with 
Israel without a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.60 
Put another way by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres:  
 
                    
58 Editorial by Syrian newspaper, Tishrin web site, Damascus, in Arabic 22 Feb 
01.  Paper rules out negotiations with Sharon. British Broadcasting Service. 
February 24, 2001. 
59 UNR 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied 
territories and the recognition of the Israeli state. UNR 338 proclaims that the 
Golan is sovereign territory of Syria.  
60 Rabinovich: 201. 
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There is no Syrian I know who is prepared to be 
less than an Egyptian,61 referring to the full 
return of the Sinai to Egypt in 1982. 
 
The mood between Syrian and Israeli negotiators 
dramatically changed when Yitzhak Rabin came to office in 
the summer of 1992, when Syria and Israel started engaging 
one on one in earnest. Prime Minster Rabin made statements 
that suggested a deal with Syria was at the core of his 
foreign policy agenda, and declared that UN Resolution 242 
applied to the Golan, and that elements of an Israeli 
withdrawal would be introduced into the negotiations.62     
To neutralize the only Arab power that has the ability 
to pose a threat to Israel’s security, Prime Minister Rabin 
recognized that Israel had to enter into a peace pact with 
Syria.  In order to achieve such an agreement, Israel has 
to pull out of the Golan.  Rabin explored the requirements 
of accommodating Syria without arousing a domestic 
backlash, and without compromising security as he 
understood it.63  
In 1993-94 Prime Minister Rabin was working to gain 
popular support for a peace accord with Syria. On 19 April 
1994, Rabin told Israel’s Parliament in a closed-door 
session that he accepted a full military withdrawal from 
the Golan, including the evacuation of all (then) thirty-
two Israeli settlements.64 Under increasing political 
demands, Rabin committed to holding a national referendum 
                    61 Clyde Haberman.  Peres Inches Towards Ceding Golan for Peace With Syria.  New 
York Times. Section A, Pg. 2, Col. 5.  May 26, 1995. 
62 Muslih. “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready:” 151. 
63 Ibid: 152. 
64 Pipes: 55. 
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before agreeing to any significant withdrawal of forces 
from the Golan Heights or to dismantling the settlements 
there.65 
Rabin was not above playing politics by talking tough 
to a domestic audience. Thus one explanation for Rabin 
acquiescing in holding a referendum was not to appear as a 
hawk but rather to precipitate a showdown with hardline 
Jewish settlers, right-wingers and fundamentalists.66 The 
referendum was never held but the domestic cost of Rabin’s 
softline approach over the Golan was reflected in an 
Israeli poll taken in May 1993, according to which 62 per 
cent of the Israeli public opposed withdrawal from any 
parts of the Golan.67  Many contend that this reflects the 
power of the well-organized Golan lobby that succeeded in 
playing the security card, which always appeals to 
mainstream Israelis even though in contrast, 71 per cent of 
Israeli military officials think that security arrangements 
were possible if much of the Golan was returned to Syria.68 
Rabin faced additional political penalties from members of 
his own Labor Party, who organized grassroots campaigns to 
oppose withdrawal from the Golan69 and from thousands of 
demonstrators who marched through Jerusalem and chanted 
slogans that branded him a traitor.70 
In April of 1994, Prime Minister Rabin presented U.S. 
Secretary of State Christopher with a peace package to take 
                    
65 Pipes: 55. 
66 Mahoud Rimawi.  “Jordan swaps notes with Syria between the two summits.”  The 
Mideast Mirror. Vol. 8, No. 12. January 19, 1994. 
67 Muslih. Dateline Damascus: “Asad is Ready:” 152. 
68 Ibid: 152. 
69 Karin Laub.  Rabin Welcomes Progress With Syria, Cautions Gaps Remain.  
Associated Press.  May 2, 1995. 
70 Bill Hutman.  Protestors call Rabin a Traitor.  The Jerusalem Post.  February 
24, 1994. 
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to Damascus.  The proposal outlined what Israel would offer 
the Syrians in return for a formal lasting peace 
agreement.71  After reviewing Rabin’s proposal, Syria’s 
Foreign Minister Shara publicly called parts of the plan 
silly and absurd.72  While the Syrians did not agree to the 
Rabin proposal, most observers concur that his softline 
approach did much to promote bilateral negotiations in an 
effort to end the conflict between the two states. 
In an effort to illustrate what returning the Golan 
Heights would bring Israel, Prime Minister Rabin (during a 
1995 radio interview,) praised Israel’s withdrawal from the 
Sinai as a bold move “whose positive fruits we are still 
enjoying today.”73 
However in November of 1995 Israeli Premier Yitzhak 
Rabin was assassinated.  After Rabin’s death, Shimon Peres 
who was Rabin’s Foreign Minister became the Israeli Prime 
Minister.  He continued bilateral negotiations with Syria 
over the Golan Heights and was optimistic that a peace 
accord could be reached. He continued with a softline 
approach, predicting that the domestic payoff would be his 
ability to campaign in the upcoming elections with a Syrian 
peace accord in his pocket.74  In early 1996, many observers 
                    
71 The Israeli proposal to Syria at this time consisted of the following actions:  
Recognize the Syria-Palestine border in place during the Mandatory period (slightly 
more preferable to Israel than the pre–1967 border), withdraw to this border in 
three stages over a five to eight year period, with the first stage to last three 
years and include the transfer of three Druze villages but no Israeli settlements to 
Syrian control.  Dismantle the thirty-two Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights 
also in stages.  In return, Syria was supposed to: demilitarize the Golan Heights 
and nearby region within Syria, disarm Hizbullah, accept America monitoring of its 
military, accede to Israeli electronic monitoring and a lookout on Mount Hermon, 
guarantee that Israel continue, to receive its share of Golan water via the Sea of 
Galilee and finally, establish full normal diplomatic ties after the first stage of 
the withdrawal was complete for example an Israeli Embassy in Syria and a Syrian 
Embassy in Israel. 
72 Pipes: 55. 
73 Haberman.  New York Times. May 26, 1995. 
74 Cobban: 20 and Rabinovich: 200. 
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expressed confidence that an agreement on the final text of 
an Israeli-Syrian peace accord would be reached. 
But early March 1996 the Peres government suspended 
talks with Syria due to several bombings by Palestinian 
extremists.  Immediately thereafter what was taken to be a 
new hardline approach resulted in the Israeli-Syrian 
relationship to plunging into a rapid downward spiral.75  
Expressions of optimism quickly changed as political 
rhetoric was exchanged and the situation developed into an 
actual confrontation in Lebanon.    
In April of 1996, IDF forces launched an extensive 
air, ground and sea bombing campaign on facilities 
throughout the southern portion of Lebanon up to, and 
including, Beirut.  The domestic cost of these hardline 
actions resulted in Labor and Shimon Peres losing the 
elections in May of 1996. 
The three years of neglect (1996-1999) on the Syrian-
Israeli track as well as stalling on the Israeli-
Palestinian talks provided the catalyst for the election 
defeat of hardline incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu by Ehud 
Barak on May 17, 1999.  After Netanyahu ruled out any 
return of the Golan, which was Syria’s chief demand, the 
Israeli public voted and elected a Prime Minister whose 
conciliatory rhetoric they favored over Netanyahu’s 
hardline approach.  Israelis clearly hoped that a softline 
approach could foster peace between Syria and Israel, thus 
promoting greater stability in the region.  
The immediate political payoff for Ehud Barak’s 
softline approach provoked the following response from 
                    
75 Cobban: 2.  
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President Hafez al-Assad, who said that the new Israeli 
Prime Minister was “a strong and honest man”76, a 
significant compliment from an Arab leader who could barely 
bring himself to pronounce the word ‘Israel’ a few years 
earlier. 
Ironically, it is interesting to note that in the May 
election, most Golan residents voted for Barak, despite his 
stated willingness to make ‘painful concessions’ regarding 
the return of the Golan Heights to Syria.77  Additionally, 
the Third Way party, dedicated to retaining the Golan, was 
voted out of Parliament entirely, losing its four seats in 
the 120-member legislature.78  
While it is difficult to find indirect evidence during 
the 2001 campaign to indicate if Barak’s softline approach 
regarding the return of the Golan Heights was a factor in 
his defeat, his position on the Golan was clear before he 
was elected Prime Minister and during his time in office.  
The following is his statement to the Knesset on December 
13, 1999, regarding the renewal of Israeli-Syrian 
Negotiations: 
                    76 Douglas Jehl. Hope Rises in Syria for Peace With Israel.  New York Times. 
Section A; Pg 1; Col. 1; Foreign Desk. 5 August 1999. 
77 Sari Bashi. In Golan Heights, Israeli settlers worried about talks with Syria.  
Associated Press, International News.  12 October 1999. 
78 Ibid. 
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Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset, I do not 
promise peace without a price.  I have never 
spread illusions; it is not my way!  More than 
two years ago, at a rally marking the thirtieth 
anniversary of settlements on the Golan Heights, 
I said the following to the Golan inhabitants, 
who are truly close to my heart: I tell you 
honestly what you know very well in your hearts: 
any government in Israel the concludes a full 
peace treaty with Syria, as we all hope, will do 
so at a painful price including a painful 
withdrawal and a change in the existing borders.  
However, I tell you that your presence and 
rootedness here will give every Israeli 
negotiator additional courage and redoubled vigor 
to stand firm on every letter and comma, in order 
to anchor and assure the most vital interests of 
the state of Israel.  I said this to the 
inhabitants of the Golan back then because I 
believe a leader must tell the truth boldly. What 
is more, the Golan residents proved in the most 
recent elections that they appreciate this.79 
 
In the Hebrew edition of the Tel Aviv newspaper 
Ha’aretz, a 500 word commentary by Yosi Werther entitled 
“Barak’s Resurrection: From Political Siege to Political 
Breakthrough, predicted, “that the resumption of the Syria-
Israeli talks will greatly benefit Barak in the domestic 
arena.”  Werther went on to note that “it restored the 
authority he lost in recent weeks” and “the revival of the 
Syrian track is expected to immediately generate some 
positive political gains for Barak, if he goes about it the 
right way.”80 
                    
79 Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Barak on the Renewal of Israeli-
Syria negotiations.  Jerusalem, 19 December, 1999.  Israeli Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs web site.  Foreign Speeches and Statements. http://www.mfa.gov.il. 
80 The Israeli Press comments on Syrian Talks. FBIS Reports of 11 commentaries in 
major Israeli dailies on 9 December 1999. Document ID: FTS19991209001648. 
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In a 300 word analysis by Ze’ve Schiff in the English 
language internet version of Tel Aviv’s newspaper Ha’aretz, 
entitled “Back to the 1923 Border,” Schiff comments that 
the decision to resume talks is a triumph both for Israel 
and Syria: “The decision to hold a meeting next week in 
Washington between Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Faruk 
al-Shara and not al-Asad, should not be seen as an Israeli 
concession but as part of a breakthrough”.81 
The domestic penalty for Prime Minister Barak and his 
softline approach towards Syria regarding the return of the 
Golan came mainly from the Golan settlers themselves, 
despite the fact that as previously mentioned most voted 
for him rather than Netanyahu. Those in this group who 
would be most troublesome would turn out to be the 
religious fanatics, who viewed the Golan as ‘Eretz Israel’ 
(The Land of Israel).  With the support of the Golan 
Settlers Council these Golan settlers have tried to sway 
public opinion and have vowed to never leave. They have 
held demonstrations in the streets, forged political 
alliances with extreme right-wing groups and have not 
rejected using violence to demonstrate their opposition and 
commitment. 
Barak meanwhile faced further domestic penalties for 
his softline approach from his political opponents on the 
right, who charged that the Prime Minister had acceded to 
all of Asad’s demands.  Barak would look bad if he were 
seen as having given up all the land on the Golan, while 
Assad remained intransigent on everything else.82  Another 
                    
81 Ibid. 
82 Sarah Honig.  Veracity is not the issue. The Jerusalem Post.  February 29, 
2000:pg 2. 
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stinging setback for Barak for his softline approach 
towards Syria and the return of the Golan came in March of 
2000, when a number of his coalition partners joined the 
right-wing opposition, to give preliminary approval to a 
bill aimed at blocking the return of the Golan Heights.83   
D. CONCLUSION 
According to Shimon Peres “to remain on the Golan is 
to give up on peace.”84  Yet throughout the years polls have 
indicated that Israelis have been evenly divided over 
whether to retain the Golan or give it back in exchange for 
peace. 
The Golan is not like the West Bank whose settlers 
moved there for ideological reasons.  While settlers have 
lived on the Golan Heights for the past 34 years, the Golan 
has not been engrained in most mainstream Israelis 
consciousness as part of Israel. 
Thus, from a softline perspective, while the domestic 
costs of the full return of the Golan Heights could lead to 
violence, the benefits of a full peace and greater regional 
stability greatly outweigh the sacrifice.  While the 
Israeli body politics is split over the return of the Golan 
Heights, there is evidence to suggest that when presented 
with a choice between war and peace in a referendum, a 
majority of Israelis would support a full withdrawal for a 
full peace according to Yuval Steinitz, a legislator of the 
opposition Likud party and an opponent of a withdrawal.85  
And as someone else has noted, when presented with a peace 
                    83 Jeffrey Heller.  Opposition Aims To Block Golan Pull Out.  Toronto Star. March 
2, 2000. 
84 Haberman. New York Times. May 26, 1995. 
85 Ibid. 
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pact, the small print won’t matter, meaning the Israeli 
public can be counted upon not to examine the details.86 
The policy of hardliners on the other hand may be 
popular at first, and such a platform (as we have seen) can 
get a person elected to office, but after years of inaction 
the Israeli public invariably demands a change and elects 
an official with a mandate for peace.  
As Egyptian President Mubarak said of former President 
Netanyahu: “he wants the peace process to continue 
according to his personal views and he is only concerned 
about security of the Israelis and settlers, this is not 
enough.  Ensuring the security of only one side would be a 
grave thing because security would not be achieved.  This 
matter was understood by Rabin and Peres, but not the new 
government.”  Mubarak added: “Peace will never be achieved 
as long as Israel keeps the occupied territories in the 
West Bank and the Golan.  Netanyahu knows this very well.”87  
Indeed at the 1997 summit in Washington D.C., King Hussein 
of Jordan told Netanyahu that he was destroying the entire 
peace process.88 
Furthermore, the international community tends to 
favor a top politician who takes a softline approach.  The 
evidence for this can be found in the international 
community’s reaction to the election victory of Ehud Barak.  
Long exasperated by Benjamin Netanyahu’s reluctance to 
engage in true meaningful peace talks, European leaders had 
the following to say about Barak.  President Jacques Chirac 
                    86 Gwynne Dyer. Demanding Deadline for Israeli PM. The Toronto Star.  Edition 1, 
3 January 2000. 
87 Mubarak PBS Interview Report.  FBIS translated text.  Cairo MENA in Arabic. 
January 7, 1997. FBIS Document ID: FTS19970107000485. 
88 Ibid. 
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of France, in a dear friend note made public by the Elysee 
Place told Mr. Barak: Your triumph was a hope for peace.89  
Germany’s Chancellor Gerhard Schroder said:  
Your compatriots have placed their trust in you, 
but beyond your country’s borders all the people 
in the region have great expectations of you at a 
critical phase in the Middle East peace process, 
which demands a special measure of courage, 
decisiveness and initiative.90   
 
Great Britain’s Tony Blair said the following: 
Mr. Barak is someone I know well and admire 
hugely.  It is a remarkable result which gives 
him a mandate to move forward with the peace 
process.91  
 
European Union envoy Miguel Moratios traveled to 
Damascus and emerged saying Syria felt that: Labor can 
achieve the final peace with Syria.92 
For top politicians dealing with the return of the 
Golan, the incentive structure favors a softline approach, 
as the political payoff is greater both domestically and 
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IV. THE GOLAN IN SYRIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
A. CHALLENGES 
Most Syrians consider the Golan Heights to be a 
bilateral security issue because of the strategic vantage 
point the Golan provides the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). 
Damascus is only thirty-seven miles away from the current 
Israeli front line, and there are no natural barriers 
between the frontier and the Syrian capital.  Thus, from a 
geostrategic point of view, the Syrians consider the Golan 
a critical natural defense against Israel.93  From a 
Syrian’s perspective, the present situation with the 
Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights poses an 
unacceptable danger.94  In terms of terrain, Syrian military 
planners believe that the Golan plateau in Syrian hands 
provides a defensive depth that is indispensable for 
Syria’s security, while a Golan controlled by Israel poses 
a lethal threat to the Syrian heartland.95   
The reality of the return of the Golan Heights is that 
this is deeply entangled in Syrian domestic politics, just 
as we saw in Israel.  
Few Syrians would question that Israel is the dominant 
military power in the region, thus for Syria to attack 
Israel would be disastrous. Despite some claims in the 
western media, Syria is not a powerful state in the Middle 
East and the Syrians know it.  The regional strategic 
situation changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
other Eastern bloc countries. Syria depended heavily on the 
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generous military aid it received from the Soviet Union, 
which Moscow is no longer willing or able to provide unless 
cash payment is made.  This has caused a decline in Syria’s 
military capability and ended Syria’s drive to reach 
military parity with Israel.  Additionally, Syria also lost 
a perceived measure of deterrence against a possible 
Israeli attack, given that its close relationship with the 
Soviet Union was presumed to have deterred Israeli 
aggression.96  
Despite reforms and development projects, the Syrian 
economy is weak. Syria does not have significant oil 
reserves, yet oil production accounts for much of Syria’s 
export income, and production levels are expected to shrink 
in the coming years.97  
Syrian officials believe that Israeli concessions to 
fully withdraw from the Golan will reap Israel strategic 
benefits because a peace with Syria will open doors for 
Israel to the Arab and Islamic worlds.98  Israel will gain 
the legitimacy it has always sought, and peace with Syria 
will pave the way for Israel’s integration into a region 
that has, in the past, rejected it and treated it as an 
alien entity.99  An Israeli-Syrian peace will greatly 
improve the prospects for normal relations between Israel 
and other Arab countries including Saudi Arabia.100  
                    
96 The Syrians considered the Soviet backing a critical element of their overall 
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For Israel, peace with Syria is the key to a broader 
regional peace. 
B. DOMESTIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A HARDLINE APPROACH 
Syria’s government need to maintain its image as the 
leader in the fight with Israel before the public, but it 
also must have the constant spectre of a foreign enemy in 
order to derive public support for its policies.101 This 
hardline approach towards Israel has costs and benefits for 
its political leaders, namely Hafez al-Asad and now his son 
Bashar. Some experts have concluded that it was important 
for Hafez al-Asad to maintain a hardline approach towards 
Israel in order to promote his domestic image as a 
nationalist Arab leader.  The political payoff for this 
approach is that he could claim to be the one Arab leader 
who did not submit to Israeli demands.102    
Hafez al-Asad’s rigid approach when dealing with the 
Israelis over the issue of the Golan was first evident 
during the signing of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement 
in Geneva in June 1974.  Syria authorized an Egyptian 
general to sign on its behalf.103  The message was clear; 
Syria would only negotiate with Israel indirectly over 
issues involving the Golan.  By taking this uncompromising 
approach, Asad denied recognition of the Jewish state and 
minimized direct contact with the Israelis.  The domestic 
benefit he enjoyed from this bargaining style demonstrated 
to the Arab world that he remained the champion of Arab 
resistance against the Zionists.   
                    101 Benedict F. Fitzgerald. Syria in Fighting Armies: Antagonists in the Middle 
East A Combat Assessment.  Edited by Richard A. Gabriel.  Greenwood Press Westport 
CN. 1983: 53. 
102 Shalev: 12. 
103 Rabinovich: 28. 
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Prior to 1991, Syria consistently had the toughest 
policy of Israel’s four neighbors, defined by the series of 
no’s: no talks before withdrawal (from the Golan), no direct 
negotiations with Israel, no partial solutions, no separate 
deal for the Golan Heights, and no formal peace treaty.104 As 
far as Syria was concerned the Golan is Syrian territory, 
occupied and settled by Israel since June 1967. The terms of 
peace for Syria with Israel are thus the complete return of 
the Golan.105  The two principles defining this policy are 
land before peace and total peace for total withdrawal.    
After Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister the window 
opened to reengage on the critical Syria-Israel peace 
talks.  There seemed to be a new confluence of mutual 
interest in a Syrian-Israeli peace. President Hafez al-Asad 
was anxious to end the dispute over the Golan106 but he did 
not waver from his hardline stance.  As Murhaf Jouejati, an 
American-educated political analyst in Damascus, commented:  
They are very serious about the Golan, and 
getting back all the Golan.  This is uppermost in 
Mr. Asad’s strategic calculi. It is the 
principle: Syria is very genuine about making 
peace, but it is not willing to give Israel a 
right where it has none.107 
 
Bashar al-Asad, like his father, views himself as the 
champion of Arab interests in the region, supporting 
Palestinian and other Arab rights.  This guiding principle 
                    104 Daniel Pipes. “Understanding Asad.” Middle East Quarterly. Vol. 1, No. 4. 
December 1994: 53. 
105 Muslih. “The Golan: Israel, Syria, and Strategic Calculations:” 611. 
106 President Asad was Defense Minister when the Golan was lost and therefore 
many say that he considers a solution for the return of the Golan a personal matter. 
107 Scott Peterson. “Syria and Israel dust off abandoned peace track.” Christian 
Science Monitor.  June 8, 1999. 
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of Syria’s foreign policy usually results in hardline 
rhetoric towards Israel.  The challenge for Bashar al-Asad 
is to convince the Syrian people that making peace with 
Israel will result in the full return of all the Golan.   
While this softline approach could produce favorable 
results, Asad (while making the final decision in domestic 
and foreign policy matters) is constrained by his country’s 
conflict with Israel, because the Syrian public will never 
accept conceding any part of the Golan to Israel.108 Syrians 
believe that the Golan has been Syrian territory from time 
immortal, and it would be political suicide for any Syrian 
leader to yield to anything less than a full withdrawal 
from the territory.109  This firm, principled Syrian stand 
has continued under President Bashar al-Asad.110 
Some analysts view Bashar al-Asad as more hardline 
than his father the late President Hafez al-Asad regarding 
the return of the Golan.  This is debatable but certainly 
he has not added or omitted anything from what his father 
demanded, namely a total Israeli withdrawal up to the June 
4th, 1967 borders.  What Bashar al-Asad is promoting more 
aggressively is his definition of a “Comprehensive Peace,” 
which includes parallel movement on the Syrian/Lebanese and 
Palestinian tracks before he will sign an agreement over 
the Golan with Israel. 
                    
108  Muslih.  “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready:” 156 and Muslih. “The Golan: 
Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations:” 629. 
109 Kemp: 93. 
110 Editorial: The Golan Will Definitely Return.  FBIS translated text.  Damascus 
Tishrin (Internet Version in Arabic). December 14, 2000. FBIS Document ID: 
GMP20001214000109. 
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In his inaugural address, Bashar al-Asad clearly 
expressed his willingness for peace, but indicated that 
there is a price: 
The liberation of our territory is at the top of 
our national priorities and is as important to us 
as the achievement of a just and comprehensive 
peace that we have adopted as a strategic choice, 
but not at the expense of our territory nor at 
the expense of our sovereignty.  Our territory 
and our sovereignty are a matter of national 
dignity and no one at all is allowed to 
compromise any of them.  We are very clear in 
dealing with peace issues, firm in our stands 
since the beginning of the peace process in 
Madrid in 1991. 
We would like to stress here that we have the 
urge to reach a state of peace but we are not 
ready to give up an inch of our territory nor do 
we accept our sovereignty impinged upon.  We 
would like to achieve peace because it is in our 
strategic choice and because we would like to 
restore our beloved Golan. 
No matter how long it may take this land will 
always be ours and will be returned complete to 
us one day sooner or later.  We are not prepared 
to pay the price of the helplessness of the 
Israeli governments and their ability to make 
decisions that push the peace process forward at 
the expense of our sovereignty and dignity.111 
 
C. DOMESTIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF A SOFTLINE APPROACH 
After the Persian Gulf War, Syria accepted a joint 
Russian-American invitation to join Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations.  Syrian acceptance instantly negated two of 
the no’s (no talk before withdrawal, no direct negations 
with Israel) already mentioned previously.  Talks between 
                    
111 Inaugural address: Bashar al-Asad.  Source and translation: Syrian Arab News 
Agency.  Arab Gateway: http://www.al-bab.com. 
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Damascus and Jerusalem began at the Madrid Peace Conference 
in October of 1991.  Between February and August 1993, Asad 
implicitly stopped insisting on three more of his 
traditional no’s: no partial solutions, no separate deal, 
and no peace treaty.112   
After years of conflict the Syrian leadership reached a 
strategic decision to make peace with Israel.113  President 
Asad made the following remarks in 1994: 
Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with 
Israel as a strategic choice that secures Arab 
rights, ends the Israeli occupation, and enables 
all peoples in the region to live in peace, 
security and dignity.  In honor we fought; in 
honor we negotiate; in honor we shall make 
peace.114   
 
Syria is ready for peace and knows that concessions 
will have to be made to Israel in order to get back the 
Golan. Hafez al-Asad recognized this fact as does his son 
and successor Bashar. Peace with Israel is the concession 
or strategic choice for Syria.  Pragmatism is likely to 
prevail with the Syrians because the alternatives of 
confrontation or military conflict with Israel are not 
viable options.  Israel maintains a pronounced military 
superiority over Syria,115 and Syrian Presidents have 
understood this. Syria will never reach strategic parity 
with Israel, a fact long accepted by the Syrian military.  
                    
112 Pipes: 54-55. 
113 Eshel: 233. 
114 Gotowicki: 31. Syrian President Hafez al-Asad, Press Conference with 
President Clinton, Geneva, January 16, 1994. 
115 Syria has suffered military defeats to the Israelis in 1948, 1967, 1973 and 
1982. 
 40
The Syrians are, in fact, afraid that Israel will attack 
Syria.116  
Peace with Israel will also promote more economic 
growth by shifting revenue from the military to job-
generating projects in the civilian sector.  The Syrian 
public, whose support for a national buildup is fading,117 
will doubtless welcome a decrease in the number of arms and 
weapons systems that will not have to be imported. Many 
Syrians believe that money diverted to civilian purposes 
will be money gained, while money spent on weapons will be 
money no longer lost.118 
In a softline approach, Hafez al-Asad shifted tactics 
regarding the issue of returning the Golan, by trying to 
gain support from sympathetic segments of Israel’s 
political spectrum, the Arab population and the Labor 
Party119 and stressing the justice of the cause, instead of 
vilifying the Jewish state.120  This new strategy may have 
some useful effect, because the Golan as an issue has not 
been so ingrained in Israelis that it is part of Israel.  
Only the small but powerful Golan Settlers Lobby has been 
trying to convince the mainstream that the Golan is a 
natural part of Israel.  
Syria’s current President Bashar al-Asad has said that 
the door of peace remains open.  In a recent interview, he 
stated that, “he was prepared to resume peace negations 
with the Jewish state provided it accepted Syria’s terms, 
                    
116 Gotowicki: 34. 
117 Muslih. “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready:” 153. 
118 Muslih. “Dateline Damascus: Asad is Ready:” 154. 
119 Rabinovich: 10.  
120 Pipes: 56. 
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namely total withdrawal from the Golan Heights, up to the 
June 4, 1967 borders.”121  This gesture to continue dialogue 
was made after Israel’s Prime Minister-elect Arial Sharon 
won the election from Ehud Barak.  While President Asad 
still holds on to the hardline stance of complete 
withdrawal, his gesture can be viewed as a softline signal 
of Syria’s desire to engage with Israel in constructive 
talks over the return of the Golan.  More importantly, 
sectors of Syria’s civil society, are timidly but steadily 
starting to make themselves heard, and they share the 
regime’s position, which wishes to exchange peace for the 
internal retrocession of the Golan Heights conquered in 
1967.122 
D. CONCLUSION 
Syrian leaders have signaled an evolution in Syrian 
policy towards Israel regarding the return of the Golan 
from promising outright military confrontation to engaging 
in diplomacy and negotiations backed by the saber rattling 
of a capable yet inferior armed force.  It is clear that 
the only viable option for the Syrians to meet their goal 
for a complete withdrawal and full return of the Golan 
Heights is a softline approach. This method will certainly 
facilitate Israel’s requirements for acceptance of the 
Jewish state, will promote mutual security and advance a 
full-fledged peace with Syria, which is the ultimate goal 
of the Israelis.  
                    
121 Interview of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad by Abderrahman al-Rashed editor 
of the pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, as translated and printed in the Mideast 
Mirror. Syria Section; Vol. 15, No. 28.  February 9, 2001. 
122 Gilles Paris and Jean-Pierre Tuquoi.  The New Arab Leaders Show Continuity.  
FBIS translated text from Paris Le Monde (Internet Version in French).  November 3, 
2000. FBIS Document ID GMP20001214000109. 
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Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Issa Darwish has said 
that the Syrian people fully support Bashar Asad, “who is 
determined to liberate occupied territories and put Syria 
on the road of economic reforms and development.”123  
President Asad knows he cannot succeed with a hardline 
approach towards Israel.  While his public rhetoric towards 
the Zionist state my be inflammatory at times, it is merely 
a public relations tool, designed to bolster his image and 
standing as a strong Arab leader (like his father), and 
champion of Arab rights in the occupied territories and the 
region. 
Taking a softline approach over the issue of the Golan 
does not mean giving up or changing the policy established 
by Hafez al-Asad, of full withdrawal for full peace based 
on Security Council resolutions and the land for peace 
formula.  In his inaugural address on 17 July, 2000 
President Bashar al-Asad can be seen mixing a softline 
approach while standing firm on Syrian requirements.   
He asserted that he is committed to the Mideast peace 
process and is “in a hurry” to achieve peace but not “at 
the expense of our land and sovereignty, which are a matter 
of national dignity, of which it is impossible and not 
allowed for anybody to surrender or touch.”124  
Indeed any Syrian leader would fall if he conceded a 
handful of land to Israel.125  Today, every map in Syria 
includes the Golan Heights as part of Syria.  For Syria, 
                    123 Susumu Sakata.  Assad’s son demands the return of the Golan Heights from 
Israel.  Japan Economic News Wire, Kyodo News Service.  June 18, 2000. 
124 Roundup, International News section.  Bashar pledges reforms, stands firm on 
return of the Golan. Deutsche-Press-Agentur.  July 17, 2000. 
125 Hande Ongoren and Safak Altun.  Is There a Turkish-Israeli Partnership 
against Iran? [FBIS translated text in Turkish].  Istanbul, 8 June 1996. FBIS 
Document ID:FTS19960608000022. 
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the return of the Golan Heights is not a matter of foreign 
relations, but is a domestic matter because of the impact 
regaining it in its entirety has on the government.126 
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
“Israel has no foreign policy; the country has only 
domestic politics,” one US Secretary of State has said.127 
In the final analysis, while the Golan Heights certainly 
provides a security buffer for the state of Israel, the 
issue of returning the Golan Heights to Syria is not about 
security or about foreign policy but very much about 
difficult domestic politics.128  For the Israelis, 
negotiating the return of the Golan has as much to do with 
pursuing peace as it does with domestic politics.129  In 
1994, Prime Minister Rabin threatened to stop talking with 
Syria if a group of Labor hawks did not withdraw the “Golan 
Bill”, which required a special parliamentary majority to 
approve any pullback from the Golan Heights.  The maneuver 
by Rabin to overcome the internal challenge to his 
authority shows how Israeli domestic politics are becoming 
the preeminent factor in negotiations with Damascus.130 
Evidence has shown that from the Israeli and Syrian 
perspectives it is possible through tough, detailed 
negotiations to reach a satisfactory agreement over the 
return of the Golan Heights.  From a military point of 
view, top military leaders agree that the security concerns 
of each country can be successfully addressed.131 
                    127 Ron Sofia. The Golan in Exchange for the Premiership. FBIS translated text in 
Russian from independent Russian-language newspaper belonging to the Yedi’ot 
Aharonot group.  December 16, 1999. FBIS Document ID:FTS19991219000737.  
128 Sarah Honig. Veracity is not the issue. The Jerusalem Post. February 29, 
2000. 
129 Scott Peterson.  “Syria and Israel dust off abandon peace track.”  Christian 
Science Monitor.  June 8, 1999. 
130 David Makovsky.  Time is running out for a deal with Syria. The Jerusalem 
Post.  September 30, 1994: 18. 
131 Muslih.  “The Golan: Israel, Syria and Strategic Calculations:” The Middle 
East Journal. Vol.47, No. 4 Autumn 1993: 625. 
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For top Israeli politicians, taking a softline 
approach on dealing with the return of the Golan Heights is 
not political suicide. The logic for this argument lies in 
the fact that most Israelis are not tied to the Golan, and 
when presented with the choice of peace or war in a 
referendum, the Israeli body politic can be expected to 
choose peace.132 
The policy implications for the United States (the 
power broker in the region), are clear, especially after 
the terrorist attacks in New York City and Arlington, 
Virginia on September 11th, 2001.  In America’s new fight 
against global terrorism, Syria can be a major contributor 
in the campaign by co-opting other Islamic countries to 
join with the United States and take a tougher stance 
against Hamas,  Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and by ending 
Syrian sponsorship and support for terrorism.  In return 
for this cooperation, Syria will want economic assistance 
from the United States and will demand the full return of 
the Golan Heights from Israel.  While it is quite doubtful 
that Ariel Sharon will acquiesce to Syrian demands, he 
might find that successful negotiations with Syria over the 
return of the Golan Heights, combined with American 
guarantees, can ward off international and domestic 
pressure to disengage from the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
East Jerusalem to reach a peace agreement with the 
Palestinians. 
The Syrian track is much less complicated or 
emotionally charged than the Palestinian one because it is 
focused on a defined piece of territory.  During the decade 
of on-again, off-again negotiations between the Israelis                     
132 Haberman. New York Times. May 26, 1995. 
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and the Syrians, the gap between both countries goals has 
been reduced to a narrow strip of land on the northeast 
shore of Lake Tiberius.   
The benefits of peace, as previously highlighted, are 
especially tangible and significant for Israel: an end to 
Hezbollah attacks, elimination of the Syrian military 
threat to Israel, disruption of the evolving reconciliation 
between Syria and Iraq, the reduction of the prospect of a 
regional war which Israel would have to fight on multiple 
fronts, and the weakening of Yasser Arafat’s stature, which 
would give the Israelis a strong edge in negotiations with 
the Palestinians.  
While Bashar al-Asad laces his public and diplomatic 
conversations with anti-Semitic remarks, the Syrian regime 
is noted for its fastidious discipline and for its 
stringent observance of signed agreements; the 1974 
Disengagement of Forces Agreement is a prime example.  Thus 
Israel would not have to worry about a Ba’thist government 
ever losing control of ‘the street’, which is a major 
concern with Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. 
The American status quo to simply maintain peace and 
quite in the Middle East is no longer enough after the 
events of September 11th 2001. The United States should 
pursue a policy which gently but firmly compels Israel to 
cede the Golan for their own self-interested reasons (which 
have already been enumerated above), in consonance with 
pressing Syria to see that it is in their best interest to 
recognize Israel and support the United States in the 
global fight against terrorism. Now more than ever, it is 
in the United State’s national strategic interest to take 
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the lead to bring Israel and Syria back to the negotiating 
table over the return of the Golan Heights and in the words 
of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad: play its full role as 
an honest broker and a co-sponsor of the peace process.133  
 
 
                    
133  Inaugural address: Bashar al-Asad.  Source and translation: Syrian Arab News 
Agency.  Arab Gateway: http://www.al-bab.com. 
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